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TRANSPARENCY SOUP: THE ACTA
NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND “BLACK BOX”
LAWMAKING
David S. Levine
ABSTRACT
The negotiations of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) have
been marred by a level of attempted secrecy heretofore unseen in
international intellectual property lawmaking. Simultaneously, the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) has been used in several significant national
contexts to prevent the disclosure of data and information in ways that call
into question its efficacy as an effective regulation of governmental
knowledge. This paper seeks to tie together these two recent developments
in order to (a) prevent future international intellectual property law
negotiations from being unduly secret and (b) encourage Congress to
consider reforming FOIA in light of current public expectations and
technological capabilities for transparency and accountability.
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INTRODUCTION

On November 19, 2009, Dan Glickman, the then-Chairman and CEO of
the Motion Picture Association of America (“MPAA”), wrote a letter to
Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont in support of a “sound and
comprehensive” Anti Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (“ACTA”). 1 ACTA
has been described by the United States Trade Representative (“USTR”),
the entity representing the United States in the negotiations, as seeking to
“establish a state-of-the-art international framework that provides a model
for effectively combating global proliferation of commercial-scale
counterfeiting and piracy in the 21st century.” 2 Indeed, ACTA will likely
become one of the most significant international agreements regarding
intellectual property laws in history, having the Group of Eight’s (“G-8”)
endorsement of this “new international legal framework.” 3
The existence of a major international agreement involving a significant
legal problem would itself be enough to warrant significant public interest.
Indeed, ACTA has garnered much public interest, but for reasons that go as
much to the process of the negotiations as they do to their substance. In the
same letter, Glickman also addressed the major procedural problem in
ACTA, one that has nearly eclipsed any substantive questions: the lack of

1

Letter from Dan Glickman, Chairman and Chief Exec. Officer, Motion Picture
Assoc. of Am., Inc. to Sen. Patrick Leahy (VT) (Nov. 19, 2009), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/22785108/MPAA-letter-re-ACTA.
2
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, Resource Center, AntiCounterfeiting Trade Representative, http://www.ustr.gov/acta (last visited Nov. 17, 2010).
3
G-8 Declarations on Economy, Environment, WALL ST. J. (Jul. 8, 2008),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121549460313835333.html.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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transparency and accountability in the negotiations. Glickman dismissed
those public concerns about the lack of transparency in ACTA’s
negotiations as a “distraction.” 4 He also labeled “opponents of ACTA” as
“indifferent to [the film industry’s] situation, or actively hostile toward
efforts to improve copyright enforcement worldwide.” 5
Glickman is correct that the concern for transparency is a distraction
from the substance. Indeed, he added that the concerns “distract from the
substance and the ambition of the ACTA which are to work with key
trading partners to combat piracy and counterfeiting across the global
marketplace.” 6 However, Glickman understates the impact of the lack of
transparency on both the procedures of government and the substance of the
law. This white paper seeks to address that “distraction” with reference to a
basic issue: what we can learn from the secrecy efforts of the USTR,
particularly through the marginal use of exemptions to the Freedom of
Information Act (“FOIA”) about the creation of international intellectual
property law in the Internet age. Although the agreement is not yet final,
we already know that the lack of transparency has caused leaked documents
and hearsay to become the basis of public policy discussions, real and
imagined issues to be debated, and a general erosion of public knowledge
about and confidence in the ACTA process. 7
The reason for these problems is that the USTR has attempted to keep
the ACTA negotiations in the proverbial “black box”: the public knows
that a box exists and that it is doing something, but cannot open it to find
and examine what’s inside. This paper addresses the observation that an
ACTA black box has proven impossible to maintain. Attesting to the
urgency of this realization are the antiquated views of the USTR when it
considered a basic question about what the public can and should know
about ACTA, and when.
In September 2009, Knowledge Ecology International made a FOIA
request to the USTR seeking “all records at USTR on the topic of the policy
and practice of USTR regard the transparency of trade negotiations,”
including ACTA. 8 An incomplete response was received in October 2009,
but among the produced documents was an email from Stan McCoy, the
Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Intellectual Property and
Innovation, sent to colleagues on February 10, 2009. In the email, which
4

Supra note 1.
Id.
6
Id.
7
The concern about and impact of the continued lack of transparency has been well
documented. See generally MICHAEL GEIST BLOG, http://www.michaelgeist.ca.
8
James Love, USTR’s February 10, 2009 Memo on Transparency Soup, KNOWLEDGE
ECOLOGY INT’L (Sept. 8, 2010), http://keionline.org/node/929.
5
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had a subject line entitled “transparency soup,” McCoy attached a draft
USTR position paper on ACTA transparency, which includes the following
in frequently asked questions (“FAQ”) format: “Q. What if U.S. positions
evolve during negotiations? [Answer:] The public can see how the U.S.
position has evolved when the final text is signed.”9 If one did not know
better, this could be viewed as a gallows-humor response to a legitimate
question. Unfortunately, it is not a joke and, although stated in a draft
document, accurately reflects the dismissive and antiquated view of
transparency and accountability that has been the hallmark of USTR’s
handling of the ACTA negotiations. Additionally, even if desirable to the
USTR, it has proven to be an untenable and unrealistic position; thus, bad
policy no matter how viewed.
Policies built on significant false
assumptions naturally run a high risk of failure.
As discussed below, in the case of ACTA, the effects of this failed
policy have already begun to emerge. For example, the futile efforts to
keep secret both the logistics of the negotiations and the substance of
ACTA has resulted in an inversion of the usual benefit of secrecy—namely,
a smooth and efficient process—in the lawmaking context, without
necessarily giving us better law. Thus, despite Glickman’s protestations,
transparency has become as important in the ACTA negotiations as the
substance of ACTA precisely because the substance would likely be
different if there had been transparency and accountability. Those
differences would have likely improved the substance, maybe not from the
MPAA’s view, but from the viewpoint that intelligently balances the
interests of all concerned.
As importantly, the experience of the ACTA negotiations also reveals
an emerging trend in freedom of information scenarios where the
government and commercial interests, working closely together, appear to
have mutual interests in keeping information of significant national concern
from the public. Ultimately, this paper proposes that the MPAA, and the
public generally, would have been better served by an ACTA process that
was open, transparent and accountable to the public from its inception. In
fact, there may have been fewer “opponents of ACTA” as a result and
resources would not have been wasted on largely futile secrecy efforts.
FOIA needs to be reconsidered in this context.
9

By February 2009, there had only been four rounds of ACTA negotiations but two
leaks of ACTA negotiating documents had already occurred, see
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/4611/125/, and their details were being discussed
on the Internet, see http://keionline.org/blogs/2009/02/03/details-emerge-of-secret-acta;
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/3660/125/. This fact alone suggests that the
USTR’s cavalier position was already fantastical. Also, an excerpt from this email forms
the title of this paper.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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II.

THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

In order to understand the context in which the bulk of the ACTA
negotiations have transpired, it’s important to note the current trends in
federal government transparency. During his first day as President of the
United States, Barack Obama issued a “memorandum for the heads of
executive departments and agencies” regarding the federal Freedom of
Information Act (“FOIA”), the federal act that mandates open government
with certain exceptions. In the first sentence of the memorandum, President
Obama noted that a “democracy requires accountability, and accountability
requires transparency.” The memorandum went on to state that FOIA
“should be administered with a clear presumption: In the face of doubt,
openness prevails.” As part of the directive, President Obama ordered the
Attorney General to issue new FOIA guidelines and the Office of
Management and Budget to “update guidance” to the agencies to effect his
directive. 10 The Attorney General issued his memorandum on March 19,
2009, in which he laid out two primary implications for how federal
agencies should respond to FOIA requests based upon President Obama’s
memorandum: “First, an agency should not withhold information simply
because it may do so legally. … Second, whenever an agency determines
that it cannot make full disclosure of a requested record, it must consider
whether it can make a partial disclosure.” 11 As discussed in more detail
below, this is a fundamental reorientation of how agencies respond to FOIA
requests.
The Office of Management and Budget took a bit more time to present
its guidance to agencies, but it did so on December 8, 2009 in a potentially
groundbreaking way, issuing its Open Government Directive (the “OMB
Memorandum”). 12 The OMB Memorandum requires federal agencies to
“take specific actions to implement the principles of transparency,
participation, and collaboration” set forth in the President’s memorandum.
This effort has been hailed as having the potential to be a “watershed
moment for democracy, the likes of which can forever change the

10

Freedom of Information Act, Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments
and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4683 (Jan. 21, 2009), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/19030725/Obama-FOIA-directive-74-FR-4683.
11
Memorandum from Attorney General Eric Holder for the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies (Mar. 19, 2009), available at www.justice.gov/ag/foia-memomarch2009.pdf.
12
Memorandum from Peter Orzag, Director of the Office of Management and Budget,
for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (Dec. 8, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/memoranda_2010/m10-06.pdf.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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relationship between the government and the public it serves.” 13 Indeed, it
has already resulted in agencies moving for the first time towards releasing
data on the Internet, making data available for download for no charge, and
disclosing previously unreleased documents for public inspection. 14 In fact,
every cabinet department is supposed to unveil a new open government
project. 15
To understand the significance of these developments, it is important to
note the general trend since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
Commentators have found that, as a general matter, the United States
government errs on the side of secrecy, especially post 9/11. 16 Moreover,
there has been increased use of the designation “Sensitive but Unclassified”
by United States government agencies. This designation is often found on
research and science/technological information generated by the
government post-9/11, and allows for it to be held from public view.17
Thus, the FOIA memorandum has the potential not only to begin reversing
the excessive, post-9/11 secrecy, but also to allow for a re-imagination of
the relationship between government and its citizens at the federal, state and
local level. 18
Unfortunately, in the ACTA negotiations, the federal government has
taken positions in favor of secrecy that undermine optimism for
fundamental change. Indeed, as reflected in the positions taken by the US
government concerning the commercial interests of the industries most
13

Ellen Miller, A Watershed Moment in Transparency and Accountability, SUNLIGHT
FOUNDATION BLOG (Dec. 11, 2009, 5:48 pm),
http://blog.sunlightfoundation.com/2009/12/11/a-watershed-moment-in-transparency-andaccountability/.
14
Miranda Fleschert, White House Announces 20 Agency Open Government
Initiatives, THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (Dec. 10, 2009),
http://www.rcfp.org/newsitems/index.php?i=11165.
15
Norm Eisen & Beth Noveck, Why an Open Government Matters, OPEN
GOVERNMENT INITIATIVE (Dec. 9, 2009),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2009/12/09/why-open-government-matters.
16
See Peter Swire, A Theory of Disclosure for Security and Competitive Reasons:
Open Source, Proprietary Software, and Government Agencies, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1333,
1337-38 (2006). This does not always mean that information remains secret, but
administrative errors cannot form the basis of a disclosure regime. See Iain Thomson, US
army posted secrets on the web, VNUNET.COM (Jul. 12, 2007),
http://www.vnunet.com/vnunet/news/2194072/army-posting-secrets-web (reporting that
the United States Army and its contractors accidentally posted military secrets on the web).
17
See GENEVIEVE J. KNEZO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33303, SENSITIVE BUT
UNCLASSIFIED: INFORMATION AND OTHER CONTROLS: POLICY AND OPTIONS FOR
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION (2006).
18
See also Andrew Malcolm, A Little Secret About Obama’s Transparency, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 21, 2010, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2010/mar/21/nation/la-naticket21-2010mar21 (“An Associated Press examination of 17 major agencies' handling of
FOIA requests found denials 466,872 times, an increase of nearly 50% from the 2008 fiscal
year under Bush.”).
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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impacted by ACTA as well as the other scenarios discussed below, a
disturbing trend may be emerging where the government aggressively
asserts the commercial interests of a private entity in denying a FOIA
request regarding issues of national importance and/or gives commercial
interests a favored position over the public in accessing otherwise-secret
information.
But very importantly, in each situation discussed below, the initial
efforts to withhold information have been overcome by, in large measure,
public interest and/or pressure. While full disclosure has not been the
result, significant information has eventually reached the public or its
disclosure is currently being litigated.
This reality should cause
policymakers to consider whether fights over secrecy are worth the battle if
some or all of the information sought will eventually be disclosed—or, in
the case of ACTA, leaked—in ways far from optimal for those otherwise
seeking secrecy. The following three examples illustrate the problem.
A. Bloomberg v. the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
A startling example analogous to the ACTA situation occurred towards
the end of the administration of President George W. Bush. On November
7, 2008, a complaint (“the Complaint”) was filed in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York by Bloomberg L.P.
(“Bloomberg”) against the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (the “Fed”) (collectively, the “Action”). 19 The action involves a
FOIA request made by Bloomberg to the Fed in May 2008 to “disclose the
recipients of more than $2 trillion of emergency loans from U.S. taxpayers
and the assets the central bank is taking as collateral.” 20
In May 2008, Bloomberg sent a FOIA request (the “Request”) to the
Fed requesting a variety of information regarding the terms of 11 Federal
lending programs. After months of not receiving a substantive response to
the Request, Bloomberg brought the Action. In the Complaint, Bloomberg
alleges that the
government documents that Bloomberg seeks are central to
understanding and assessing the government’s response to the
most cataclysmic financial crisis in America since the Great
Depression. The effect of that crisis on that American public has
19

Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Bloomberg L.P. v. Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, No. 08-CV-9595 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2008).
20
Mark Pittman, Fed Refuses to Disclose Recipients of $2 Trillion (Correct),
BLOOMBERG.COM (Dec. 12, 2008),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aGvwttDayiiM.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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been and will continue to be devastating. Hundreds of
corporations are announcing layoffs in response to the crisis and
the economy was the top issue for many Americans in the recent
elections.

Bloomberg, in its Request, sought a variety of documents including, in
its seventh itemized request, “records sufficient to show the terms of the
loans and the rates that borrowers must pay.” In the Complaint, Bloomberg
explained the significance of the information sought from a transparency
perspective:
In response to the crisis, the Fed has vastly expanded its lending
programs to private financial institutions. To obtain access to
the public money and to safeguard the taxpayers’ interests,
borrowers are required to post collateral. Despite the manifest
public interest in such matters, however, none of the programs
themselves make reference to any public disclosure of the posted
collateral or of the Fed’s methods of valuing it. Thus, while the
taxpayers are the ultimate counterparty for the collateral, they
have not been given any information regarding the kind of
collateral received, how it was valued, or by whom.

After the Complaint was filed but before it was answered, the Fed
responded to the Request in a five page letter (the “Letter”). 21 With specific
regard to the above noted request, the Fed advised that it had located
responsive “documents (daily reports) containing certain information
(specifically, the names of participants, originating Federal Reserve Bank
district, names of borrowers, individual loan amounts and origination and
maturity dates).”
However, the Fed decided to withhold this
“approximately 231 full pages of information” because, inter alia, they
contained confidential commercial information.
Although FOIA can properly protect privately-held commercially
valuable information, 22 the disturbing element is that the government
seemingly went out of its way to protect commercial interests in the context
of an unprecedented bank loan program where the taxpayers had an
exposure of $2 trillion. For example, the Fed noted that it “has to be and is
mindful of the commercial and financial interests of borrowers, the
institutions whose collateral secured the borrowings.” It explained that
“institutions that may potentially borrow [from the Fed] recognize that
counterparts and market analysts may draw adverse inferences about their
21

Letter from Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary of the Board, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System to Mark Pittman, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 9, 2008 (on file with author).
22
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2010).
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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financial health if the institutions do turn to [the Fed] and, for that reason,
such institutions can be extremely concerned about the stigma of borrowing
[from the Fed].” Thus, disclosure would “harm individual borrowers’
competitiveness.”
While also arguing that such secrecy protects the interests of the
taxpayer and the Fed in administering the loan program, it is clear that the
Fed is asserting, in part, the commercial interests of its borrowers in
denying the Request. However, as Bloomberg explains in the Complaint,
the “public’s interest is particularly pronounced in light of the new
expansive powers of the Fed, the new risks that the Fed is taking with
public money, and the ongoing financial crisis and its effects on the
American economy.” The conflict is clear: the commercial interests of the
private entities versus the public’s “right to know.” In other words, as in
ACTA, the commercial entities have found proxies, the federal government
and FOIA, to control the flow of information regarding their interests to the
public. 23 Here, the commercial entities get favored treatment by virtue of
their commercial dealings with the government and hence know far more
about the operations of the Fed than the public that funds it. Indeed, in a
related Bloomberg FOIA request to the Fed which resulted in the
production of 560 pages of marginally (at best) relevant and heavily
redacted emails some 20 months after they were requested, one
commentator summed up FOIA as
honorable and useful if:
A) You’re not asking for information about the bank
bailout.
B) You’re happy to wait years for the requested
information.
C) You don't mind if the requested documents are 95%
blacked out when you finally get them. 24

23

Importantly, Bloomberg was ultimately successful in court. See Opinion and Order,
Bloomberg L.P. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, No. 08-CV-09595
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2009), available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a7CC61ZsieV4 (follow
“Attachment: Court Document” hyperlink); Bloomberg, L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys., 601 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2010). However, as of this writing, the Fed has
not produced the requested documents.
24
Katya Wachtel, Fed Gives Bloomberg the Lamest FOIA Document Ever, as
Everything That Matters is Blacked Out, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct 25, 2010),
http://www.businessinsider.com/fed-protects-citi-and-itself-from-foia-request-sendsWWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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Thus, the impact of such a partnership raises disturbing issues about the
role of government as simultaneously a commercial lender and a protector
of the public’s interests, and should cause policymakers to question whether
the government can play those dual roles, especially where there is strong
public interest in timely disclosure of the information, without undermining
the public’s right to know.
B. British Petroleum and Corexit
In the wake of the massive British Petroleum (“BP”) Gulf oil spill,
Nalco Co.’s (“Nalco”) Corexit dispersants have been used to mitigate the
damage associated with the spill.25 The problem: massive use of the
dispersant could cause unknown health and safety risk to human and marine
life. 26 After requests for Nalco to publically release information about the
chemical formula so that researchers could attempt to ascertain the potential
impact of this unprecedented use 27, Nalco released the ingredients to the
public but shielded the exact concentration formula of the chemicals, stating
that they are trade secrets. 28
The exact formula for Corexit, whose use has been banned in the United
Kingdom, 29 is held by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”).
Because of a general dearth of information regarding the impact of Corexit,
the Gulf Restoration Network and the Florida Wildlife Federation made a
FOIA request to the EPA for information regarding health and safety data
regarding the dispersants. After failing to receive a response to the
requests, these parties brought an action against the EPA seeking “data and
studies submitted to EPA pursuant to [relevant law] regarding dispersants

hundreds-of-blacked-out-pages-to-bloomberg-reporter-2010-10#ixzz1430hkFG0.
25
Erick Kraemer, What Is COREXIT and Why Is It Still Being Used in the Gulf,
DISASTER ACCOUNTABILITY BLOG (Jul. 28, 2010),
http://blog.disasteraccountability.com/2010/07/28/what-is-corexit-and-why-is-it-still-beingused-in-the-gulf/.
26
Anne Mulkern, Maker of Controversial Dispersant Used in Gulf Oil Spill Hires Top
Lobbyists, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 25, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/06/25/25greenwire-maker-of-controversialdispersant-used-in-gulf-94328.html.
27
Press Release, Earthjustice, Conservation Groups Act to Uncover What’s in Gulf Oil
Dispersants (Jul. 14, 2010), http://www.earthjustice.org/news/press/2010/conservationgroups-act-to-uncover-what-s-in-gulf-oil-dispersants (“Well over 1 million gallons of
dispersants have been used so far, and for the first time, dispersants are being applied under
the ocean, where the oil is pouring into the Gulf.”).
28
David Biello, Is Using Dispersants on the BP Gulf Oil Spill Fighting Pollution with
Pollution?, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Jun. 18, 2010,
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=is-using-dispersants-fighting-pollutionwith-pollution.
29
Id.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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and their constituents, and unredacted copies of communications between
EPA and BP concerning the use of dispersants during the response to the
BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill.” 30 As of this writing, the action is
ongoing.
Presumably, the EPA would take the position that the requested
information is a trade secret and/or confidential commercial information
under FOIA. 31 Indeed, the EPA would likely be correct, revealing a
separate problem in FOIA. 32 But, even if FOIA operates as an impediment
to disclosure of much information, it is not an impediment to disclosure of
all information unless the administrative agency holding the information
willfully slows down the process. Such was the case here, where the delay
in releasing the components that make up Corexit was a direct result of the
EPA’s willingness to protect Nalco and BP’s interests over that of the
public. As the public interest group OMB Watch explained upon the
release of the components of Corexit,
After weeks of gallon after gallon pouring into the Gulf, finally
the public is given the most basic information crucial to
monitoring the fate and impacts of these chemicals. EPA had the
authority to act all along; its decision to now disclose the
ingredients demonstrates this. Yet it took a public outcry and
weeks of complaints for the agency to act and place the public's
interest ahead of corporate interests.33

Here, as in Bloomberg and as has been seen in ACTA, continual public
pressure on EPA forced it to release information that it would have
preferred to keep secret. The confluence of intense public pressure and
distribution of knowledge, beyond that found in the Bloomberg and ACTA
scenarios, impelled the EPA to offer some information to the public so that
research into its health and safety effects could proceed. In doing so, it
risked the ire of corporate interests, and legitimately causes the public to
question where the EPA’s loyalties and political interests lie. 34 Yet, FOIA

30

Id.; Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Fla. Wildlife Fed’n, Inc. v.
Johnson (No. 4:2008cv00324) (N.D. Fla. Jul. 17, 2008), available at
http://emerginglitigation.shb.com/Portals/f81bfc4f-cc59-46fe-9ed57795e6eea5b5/complaint-and-exhibits-fwf-v-usepa-07-17-08.pdf.
31
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2010).
32
This is a separate problem in FOIA that I have addressed in David S. Levine,
Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in Our Public Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L.
REV. 135 (2007).
33
Brian Turnbaugh, EPA Finally Discloses What’s in the Oil Spill Dispersants, OMB
WATCH (Jun. 8, 2010), http://www.ombwatch.org/node/11062.
34
See Mulkern, supra note 26 (former EPA employee now lobbyist for Balco).
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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remains an impediment to much information, as public pressure alone
cannot change the language of the law.
C. ACTA
FOIA has been interpreted to exist, in part, to prevent the development
of “secret law.” 35 Yet the ACTA negotiations’ lack of transparency
heightens the concerns that “secret law” is precisely what is being
developed. Here, the focus is not the power of the purse or public health
and safety concerns, but another fundamental role of government,
lawmaking. Unfortunately, a similar response to that of Bloomberg’s
request occurred with FOIA requests made by KEI to the United States
Trade Representative, the office representing the United States in the ACTA
negotiations, in the early days of the Obama administration. In January
2009, KEI sought seven specific documents that reflected proposals for the
substantive text of ACTA. 36 In a summary response in March 2009, around
the same time as the OMB Memorandum, the UTSR denied the request
under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), an exemption to FOIA for information “to be
kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy.” 37 As James
Love, KEI’s Director, explained upon receipt of the denial letter:
The texts are available to the Japanese government. They are
available to the 27 member states of the European Union. They
are available to the governments of Canada, Mexico, New
Zealand, Australia. They are available to Morocco, and many
other countries. They are available to “cleared” advisers
(mostly well connected lobbyists) for the pharmaceutical,
software, entertainment and publishing industries. But they are
a secret from you, the public. 38

Again, while the law may support such a denial by the USTR, a
disturbing reality has emerged. Just as the Fed asserted the commercial
interests of commercial borrowers in fighting Bloomberg’s FOIA request
and thereby maintaining the borrowers’ superior knowledge about the
program, the USTR has elevated the commercial interests of a variety of

35

Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 369 (1976).
See James Love, Obama Administration Rules Texts of New IPR Agreement are
State Secrets, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 12, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jameslove/obama-administration-rule_b_174450.html.
37
Id. This conclusory response makes the Fed’s response to Bloomberg’s FOIA
request seem verbose by comparison.
38
Id.
36
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commercial entities over the general interests of the public. The result has
been distribution of information, not otherwise public and utilizing nondisclosure agreements (“NDA”), to (primarily) corporate entities and their
proxies. 39 These special groups apparently have their own freedom of
information rules; the public has no opportunity to sign an NDA and are not
“cleared advisors,” thus the public cannot get the real-time information to
which these special groups are privy. 40 The result is that these NDAsigning entities and/or “cleared advisors” are far better positioned to offer
meaningful, real-time input than the public—an odd result given the
existence of FOIA. Information disparities fueled rather than rectified by
an open government law should give us pause.
More strikingly, this broad power of the USTR to control the flow of
information via FOIA is not an accident. Rather, the general derivation of
this power in the USTR comes from the Obama administration’s choice to
continued designating ACTA as an Executive Agreement, thereby
bypassing Congress and the traditional transparent format for negotiating
international agreements. 41 This choice has been largely responsible for a
stunning lack of transparency as compared to a variety of international
institutions that facilitate international agreements, including WIPO (World
Intellectual Property Organization), WTO (World Trade Organization),
OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), CSTD
(Commission on Science and Technology for Development), and IGF
(Internet Governance Forum). 42 Indeed, with the exception of official
released drafts late in the negotiating process in April and October 2010, the
public has had to rely on guesswork and speculation based upon leaked
texts and rumors to ascertain the state of play.
The result is a mutation of what would otherwise be a largely public
debate about the merits and terms of ACTA into what has been, until

39

See James Love, White House Shares the ACTA Internet Text with 42 Washington
Insiders, under Non-Disclosure Agreements, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Oct. 13, 2009),
http://keionline.org/node/660. Indeed, when KEI requested the names of the entities that
had signed an NDA and received a copy of the ACTA text, the USTR’s initial response
was to deny it, again on the grounds that “the release of the names of persons who had seen
the text would undermine the national security of the United States.” Id.
40
KEI was one of the very few non-commercial entities that was given an opportunity
to sign an NDA. Id. That, however, is not the same as public disclosure of information.
41
See Eddan Katz, Stopping the ACTA Juggernaut, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUNDATION (Nov. 19, 2009), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/11/stopping-actajuggernaut for detailed discussion of this issue; see also infra note 42.
42
See Jeremy Malcolm, Public Interest Representation in Global IP Policy Institutions
13-17 (American Univ. Washington College of Law PIJIP Research Paper Series, Paper
No. 6, 2010), available at
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=resear
ch.
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recently, mostly a hearsay-laden speculative debate. This is a policy choice
on the part of the Obama administration that has given corporate entities a
“most favored nation” status with, as will be discussed below, limited real
benefits to the negotiation process or the public. The result of these
activities can be summarized by stating succinctly that intellectual property
law agreements have apparently become issues of national security that
require the input of commercial interests but not the public at large. As
Peter Yu points out, this “national security” concern is “more correctly
identified with the maintenance of good foreign or diplomatic relations with
ACTA negotiating partners.” 43 Even if this concern has some merit, as
negotiating partners may want to be free of public relations concerns as they
negotiate, 44 FOIA has allowed that concern to trump those of a public that
has legitimate concerns about the impact of ACTA on domestic law. Thus,
this designation has allowed the USTR to deny many ACTA-related FOIA
requests and, in combination with an apparent trend maintaining secrecy
despite promising statements from the early days of the Obama
administration, has created an environment in which ACTA may very well
go down as the least transparent international agreement in living memory.
Compounding the problem, similar to the Fed’s denial of FOIA requests
regarding $2 trillion in loans to banks, the USTR does not seem particularly
concerned that the public will not get information about an agreement that
could impact every U.S. citizens’ rights under copyright law. 45 The terms
surrounding $2 trillion in federal loans, public health and safety in the Gulf
of Mexico, and lawmaking about basic IP protections are significant issues
of national importance, if not security, involving close interactions between
government and the effected private interests. All are situations where
private commercial interests in secrecy have been given higher priority than
the public’s interest in basic information—and the government, ironically
aided by FOIA, has amplified the detrimental impact on public transparency
and accountability through its close interactions with the interested
commercial entities.
Therefore, while three examples, albeit very
significant, do not a trend make, they do suggest an emerging mode of
response to major issues of national importance when a meaningful segment
of the public may differ with the official position taken by the government
and/or commercial interests—if they knew what the exact position was.
This emerging trend of decreased information flow warrants further
exploration and monitoring.
43

Peter Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REV. (forthcoming
2011) at 20, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1624813.
44
Id. at 20-21.
45
See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
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In sum, the examples of Bloomberg/Fed, BP and ACTA, indicate that
FOIA needs to be reconsidered. Especially because of the strong mutuality
of interest that exists when significant public interest concerns a major joint
effort of government and business, as in the government’s reliance on BP to
clean up the Gulf oil spill, the government’s multi-trillion dollar loans to
financial entities, and the government’s close consultation with primarily
corporate entities on matters of international lawmaking in ACTA, one may
legitimately question whether FOIA is up to the task of balancing the
public’s interest with that of the government and its corporate partners.46
More specifically, FOIA seems to assume an ability to keep and maintain
secrets about matters of significant public concern that may not be realistic
in an Internet-dominated 2010. Indeed, as the authors of Millennial
Makeover suggest, we are due for such a reassessment of law as “in every
[political] realigning era the nation has also experienced a growth and
success of new communication technologies.” 47 Thus, along the lines of the
Obama administration’s early admonitions to make government more
transparent, FOIA needs to be reconceptualized to reflect the broad
information sharing powers and expectations that the Internet has
established. Facilitation of this analysis by policymakers, with reference to
the ongoing ACTA negotiations, is the focus of the remainder of this paper.
III.

ACTA AND THE INTERNET: SECRECY AND ITS PRIMARY THEORETICAL
BENEFIT UPENDED

Despite the efforts at secrecy, some ACTA information has leaked to an
eager public and, to a lesser extent, has been officially released. This
information, perhaps because it is so unusual to receive, has been rapidly
disseminated by the Internet. 48 Thus, the related question is whether
attempts at secrecy, and any theoretical benefits of secrecy, can be
maintained in the face of an international negotiation that has broad public
interest, namely, the state of IP law, and a public that has a robust and
pervasive tool with which to communicate and share information, namely,
the Internet. While the downsides of ACTA secrecy have been welldocumented, 49 the more challenging question is whether, in 2010, the
benefits of secrecy are even possible when there is a strong public interest in
46

The government may not have perfect mutuality of interest in these scenarios, but
are clearly operating as partners to achieve a mutually identified goal. The exact
parameters of this balancing are beyond the scope of this paper, but a subject of current
research.
47
MORLEY WINOGRAD & MICHAEL D. HAIS, MILLENNIAL MAKEOVER 49 (2008).
48
See ACTAwatch.org, kei.org, eff.org generally.
49
Id.
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the information? Apart from the transparency concerns, which are a
normative basis for more disclosure, is this behavior nonetheless defensible
from a practical perspective as a preferred mode of lawmaking? In this
section, I propose that the answer is likely no.
Commentators have roundly criticized the lack of disclosure and
accountability since the beginning of the ACTA negotiations. The primary
concerns have been (1) general erosion of deliberative democracy, (2) onesided input that reflects primary commercial perspectives, (3) speculation
and guesswork replacing real discussion of the issues, and (4) erosion of the
legitimacy of the process and eventual law. All of these concerns have all
played a part in the public condemnation of the negotiators’ positions on
transparency and accountability. 50 But what about the primary benefit of
secrecy, namely, smooth and efficient negotiations free from external
influences, be they “political complications in the capitals to opposition
from civil society groups?”51 As the Internet exists as a pervasive means to
disseminate information on issues of significant public concern, the
remainder of this paper suggests that this benefit is difficult, and in some
cases impossible to maintain when (a) an issue of significant national
interest is receiving national attention, and (b) there is an organized and
technologically-savvy group of interested members of the public that are
not receiving the desired information.
Therefore, under these
circumstances, governmental policies formulated with an assumption of the
ability to maintain strong secrecy run a risk of failure to the extent that
secrecy is fundamental to achieving the given goals.
A. Problems with the Secrecy Assumption
There are several problems with the assumption of an ability to maintain
strong secrecy in the context of ACTA. From the beginning of information
leaking about the mere existence of ACTA negotiations, concerns were
raised that ACTA was locked inside the proverbial black box. As Professor
Michael Geist, arguably Canada’s leading copyright scholar, noted in an
early commentary, ACTA
could ultimately prove bigger than WIPO—without the
50

Yu, supra note 43, at 22.
Id.; see also Fact Sheet: Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, EUROPEAN
COMMISSION (Oct. 23, 2007) (Updated Nov. 2008),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/october/tradoc_140836.11.08.pdf (“For reasons
of efficiency, it is only natural that intergovernmental negotiations dealing with issues that
have an economic impact, do not take place in public and that negotiators are bound by a
certain level of discretion.”).
51
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constraints of consensus building, developing countries, and civil
society groups, the ACTA could further reshape the IP landscape
with tougher enforcement, stronger penalties, and a gradual
eradication of the copyright and trademark balance.52

Thus were the antecedents of a concerted effort to grab the most useful
information about the state of the ACTA, namely, actual drafts of the
agreement. The results of this effort were startling and form the main
reason for questioning the possibility that McCoy could get what he
proscribed in his FAQ: despite coordinated international efforts to maintain
the security of negotiating drafts, at least six full or partial drafts were
leaked and widely disseminated on the Internet by highly-read technology
information websites including Boing Boing and Wikileaks. 53
To be clear, leaks are not a system of public transparency, and the
information adduced cannot usually be used to offer much meaningful input
to policymakers. Indeed, not surprisingly, the USTR did not offer any
formal ways for the public to offer input on leaked information.
Nonetheless, while the public was not able to get a perfect picture of the
United States’ position, it was simply wishful thinking—from the
beginning—for the USTR to assert that the public would find out the United
States’ evolution only when the agreement was signed. Indeed, a week
before the date of McCoy’s email, the second leak of an ACTA draft had
been publicly discussed and analyzed. 54 The USTR, Ambassador Ron Kirk,

52

Michael Geist, Is ACTA the New WIPO?, MICHAEL GEIST BLOG (Oct. 24, 2007),
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/2318/99999/.
53
The first leak occurred on May 22, 2008 and was reported by Wikileaks. Proposed
U.S. ACTA Plurilateral Intellectual Property Trade Agreement (2007),
http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Proposed_US_ACTA_plurilateral_intellectual_property_trade_ag
reement_%282007%29. The second, a more modest leak, occurred in February 2009.
Putting Together the ACTA Puzzle: Privacy, P2P Major Targets, MICHAEL GEIST BLOG
(Feb 3, 2009), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/3660/125/. The third leak
occurred in April 2009 and was again published on Wikileaks. Classified US, Japan, and
EU ACTA Trade Draft Agreements, 2009,
http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Classified_US%2C_Japan_and_EU_ACTA_trade_agreement_dra
fts%2C_2009. The fourth, focusing on Internet issues, occurred in November 2009, The
ACTA Internet Chapter: Putting the Pieces Together, MICHAEL GEIST BLOG (Nov 3, 2009),
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/4510/99999/, and the fifth, a full text, was leaked
in March 2010. ACTA’s De Minimus Provision: Countering iPod Searching Border Guard
Fears, MICHAEL GEIST BLOG (Mar. 23, 2010),
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/4900/125/. The most recent leak occurred in
September 2010. Latest Leaked Draft of Secret Copyright Treaty: U.S. Trying To Cram
DRM Rules Down the World’s Throats, BOING BOING (Sept. 6, 2010),
http://boingboing.net/2010/09/06/latest-leaked-draft.html.
54
Michael Geist, Putting Together the ACTA Puzzle: Privacy, P2P Major Targets,
MICHAEL GEIST BLOG (Feb. 3, 2009), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/3660/125/;
James Love, Details Emerge of Secret ACTA Negotiation, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L
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also maintained this position in December 2009, telling KEI’s James Love
that the ACTA text would be made public “when it is finished.” 55
However, at that time, at least four leaks had occurred. Policymaking based
upon wishful thinking cannot lead to good law, and the realities of the
USTR’s limited ability to maintain such secrecy might explain why
negotiators finally caved and released an “official” draft text in April
2010. 56
Aside from the basic fact that draft texts and portions thereof were being
leaked despite this official stance, part of the problem with the USTR’s
failure to maintain such secrecy is that the USTR’s support and
encouragement of ironclad secrecy over the negotiations stands in stark
contrast to other international bodies charged with lawmaking in the
intellectual property law sphere.
For example, the World Health
Organization, WTO, which includes the TRIPS Council, and the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law, all major IP treaty
entities, publish agendas, participants, meeting minutes, and draft
documents on their respective web sites. 57 Indeed, as Jeremy Malcolm
noted in his recent study of a number of international institutions, including
WIPO and WTO, “even the WTO, the least participatory of the
organizations studied, posts all of its official documents online, and most of
the other institutions [including WIPO] also make available negotiating
texts.” 58 Malcolm concludes that “ACTA meets none of the basic best
practices for transparency of the existing institutions of the intellectual
property policy regime.” 59 Thus, the USTR had virtually no precedent for
such an extreme maneuver, and the public rightly expected more
information based upon past precedents.
Indeed, the strategy led to a letter penned by Senator Ron Wyden of
Oregon to the USTR in late 2009 asking for the USTR’s specific ACTA
negotiation positions. Upon receiving a response, Wyden issued a press
release in January 2010 where he noted that he was attempting to “shed
light” on ACTA’s “secret negotiations” and sought to “encourage [the
USTR] to give the public a say over issues that so profoundly affect their
(Feb. 3, 2009), http://keionline.org/blogs/2009/02/03/details-emerge-of-secret-acta.
55
James Love, Ambassador Kirk: People Would be “Walking Away from the Table”
if the ACTA Text is Made Public, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Dec. 3, 2009),
http://keionline.org/node/706.
56
Michael Geist, The ACTA Timeline: Tracing the Secret Copyright Treaty, MICHAEL
GEIST BLOG (Dec. 10, 2009), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/4611/125/.
57
ACTA is Secret. How Secret are Other Global Norm Setting Exercises?,
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Jul. 21, 2009), http://www.keionline.org/miscdocs/4/attachment1_transparency_ustr.pdf; see also Jeremy Malcolm, supra note 42.
58
Malcolm, supra note 42 at 15, 17.
59
Id. at 20.
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lives, as trade policies often do.” 60 The highly unusual action of a
Democratic senator challenging an appointee of a Democratic President on
a major international negotiation, combined with the stark differences in
negotiation transparency and accountability between ACTA and all other
major international intellectual property agreements of recent vintage,
suggest that the USTR’s apparent strategy of extreme secrecy was a nonstarter.
Additionally, despite the possibility of a streamlined process where
public input is virtually non-existent and a hand-picked group of advisors
periodically offer counsel to the USTR, evidence suggests that ACTA has
actually taken longer to negotiate than many similar international IP
agreements. Assuming that ACTA negotiations began in June 2008 and of
this writing have not concluded, the ACTA negotiations have taken two and
a half years. While this is not an excessive amount of time to negotiate a
multi-lateral international agreement, KEI notes that it is longer than
negotiations for nine of sixteen multilateral IP agreements. 61 For example,
the 1996 WIPO Internet treaties were negotiated in less than two years,
whereas WTO’s TRIPS, concluded in 1993 and arguably the most
significant IP treaty, took three and a half years to negotiate. Thus, while
there are many factors that enter into the speed with which a treaty is
negotiated, it is at least questionable whether the efforts at secrecy, however
flawed, have actually streamlined the negotiation process. Especially as
WIPO and WTO are more transparent but have been able to conclude major
recent international IP agreements in comparable or less time than ACTA,
the received wisdom that secrecy inevitably leads to a streamlined and
efficient negotiation process in IP lawmaking should be challenged.
Aside from the questionable practical impact of excessive secrecy, the
USTR’s position is rendered even more untenable simply because it does
not meet current expectations of a transparent and accountable government.
The Internet has raised public expectations of what transparency and
accountability look like, and policymakers ignore this shift at their peril.
Indeed, as illustrated in ACTA, interested parties can force transparency
where little or none is officially desired. Once transparency is forced by the
public, any administrative efforts to realistically control disclosure becomes
tainted at best and futile at worst. Hence, the USTR’s largely unsuccessful
efforts to maintain black box secrecy can be reasonably explained and
60

Malini Aisola, USTR Responds to Senator Wyden’s Letter on ACTA, KNOWLEDGE
ECOLOGY INT’L (Mar. 2, 2010), http://keionline.org/node/791.
61
Alberto Cerda, How Much Time is Necessary to Negotiate the Text of a Multilateral
Agreement on Intellectual Property?, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Jun. 4, 2010),
http://keionline.org/node/861.
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dismissed as little more than an effort to prevent the public from knowing
about the lawmaking activities of its representatives.
Indeed, as KEI explained to Ambassador Kirk in December 2009 while
KEI’s Love was sitting next to Ambassador Kirk on an airplane, getting the
text when it was concluded “was too late, and the public wanted the text out
now, before it is too late to influence anything.” 62 Because of the public
outcry regarding the lack of transparency and the rapid dissemination and
analysis of the leaked texts 63, which presumably has distracted the USTR
somewhat from focusing on the substance of the agreement, time will tell
whether the final draft reflects indirect input offered by the public recipients
of the leaked and “official” texts. Nonetheless, it seems clear that despite
the USTR’s efforts, this has not been a process wholly devoid of public
input. At a minimum, the public has compelled some disclosure and forced
the USTR and other negotiating parties to defend the official policy of not
releasing drafts and other valuable information. 64
Reflecting current public expectations on transparency is an anonymous
comment to the December 2009 KEI story. Reacting to Ambassador Kirk’s
statement to KEI’s Love that the issue of transparency “was about as
complicated as it can get,” the commenter summed up a general public
reaction when secrecy is maintained regarding issues of national concern
where the perception is that interested private industry has more access to
information than the public: “Transparency is only complicated when
you’re being dishonest.” 65 When extreme efforts exist to keep secret a
major international negotiation designed to create new law and international
enforcement institutions on a hot-button issue like copyright piracy, one can
expect negative public reaction once the existence of the negotiations are
revealed. Therefore, whether this view reflects reality is secondary to the
fact that it is a logical reaction to the USTR’s efforts.
The failure of the USTR to maintain the black box, you’ll-find-outwhen-it’s done method of lawmaking has proven its weakness as a
lawmaking modality. Real-time disclosure of information is expected and
key to a deliberative democracy, and the USTR’s efforts reflect a policy that
62

See Love, supra note 55. This interaction between KEI’s Love and Ambassador
Kirk was reported in a number of major Internet news outlets, including Tech Dirt, Wired,
Boing Boing and Slashdot, further attesting to the ability of the Internet to quickly
disseminate information to an interested community. Id.
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See American University Washington College of Law’s PIJIP ACTA paper series,
available at http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/research/.
64
See Love, supra note 55. Aside from forcing draft releases, public outcry has also
resulted in changes to meeting agendas. See ACTA to Meet Sept. 23: Locking Out Civil
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is opposed to such disclosure. Indeed, offering input on drafts at the end of
a negotiation process is not as valuable as having input when the document
is being initially drafted and its core goals and terms negotiated. That
primary opportunity for substantively meaningful real-time input was
denied by the USTR’s efforts. Therefore, putting aside the reality of
organized citizens with access to the greatest system of information sharing
ever invented, the USTR’s position is difficult to defend simply because it
curtails democratic legitimacy and public buy-in on the laws enacted.
The Internet exacerbates the failings of this policy. Once we engraft the
reality of the Internet and an organized and technologically savvy interested
public onto these legitimacy problems, the USTR’s position becomes not
only damaging to democracy, but nearly impossible to achieve. Indeed, as
seen in ACTA, increased public condemnation and outcry forcing some
begrudging disclosure leads to something less than a smooth and efficient
process. In sum, the USTR’s statements have proven little more than
wishful thinking regarding a bad idea. Such thinking should be abandoned
in future international negotiations.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Going back to Jeremy Bentham and even earlier, the theoretical bases
against secrecy in a democracy have been known and articulated. 66 In the
ACTA negotiations, secrecy’s modern practical limitations in a democracy
have been shown. In 2010 it should be received wisdom that the kind of
secrecy possible before the advent of the Internet—the proverbial “black
box”—is increasingly difficult to maintain and therefore, from a practical
perspective, should not be part of lawmakers’ considerations in deciding
how best to create and enact law. Indeed, the mainstream media
understands this point well. In its promotion of its political comedy series
The Thick of It, the BBC noted that if:
24 hours is “a long time in politics,” the two decades since Yes,
Prime Minister [a 1980s BBC show] now seem like light years
ago. So when The Thick of It first appeared in 2005, it was well
overdue. Secrets are harder to keep in this age of cell phone
cameras, blogs and Tweets. 67
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See Levine, supra note 32 at 158-159.
Putting you “In the Loop” about the Thick of It, BBC AMERICA (Apr. 29, 2010),
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Especially regarding a hot-button and controversial issue like piracy
enforcement in the international context, 68 absolute secrecy cannot be
maintained. The ACTA negotiations have, in Glickman’s word, been
marred by “distraction” as the public clamored for information. This paper
seeks to advance the discussion by pointing out that the leaks and resulting
opaque “transparency soup”—or, put another way, partial, uncontrolled and
haphazard secrecy—upends the main benefit associated with secrecy
generally, streamlining and efficiency. That benefit can only be achieved
by maintaining the black box, an outcome proven difficult and in many
cases, like ACTA, impossible in 2010.
Rather than amplifying public buy-in and input, disclosure of
information authorized or by leak, after a policy decision has been made,
seems to primarily discredit the withholding institutions without allowing
for the benefit of meaningful real-time public input at the critical point
when policy is being formulated and law written. For example, the kind of
secrecy envisioned by the USTR needlessly created and fostered an
adversarial relationship with the public that reinforced the worst fears and
criticism about lawmakers in 2010. Simultaneously, leaks and/or official
drafts were released in the midst of the purported black box policy.
Therefore, the level of secrecy necessary to create a smooth and efficient
negotiation environment proved impossible to attain. Thus, the public was
afforded something less than an efficient mode of lawmaking while at the
same time losing faith in the institutions involved.
Combined with the reality that governments, particularly administrative
agencies, and private industry may often have a strong mutuality of interest
in keeping information regarding matters of significant national concern
from the public, we also have a scenario where the structure of FOIA needs
to be reconsidered. As economist Alfred E. Kahn explained,
When a commission is responsible for the performance of an
industry, it is under never completely escapable pressure to
protect the health of the companies it regulates, to assure a
desirable performance by relying on those monopolistic chosen
instruments and its own controls rather than on the unplanned
and unplannable forces of competition.69

As the examples discussed in this paper illustrate, limiting transparency
can be seen as broadly part of the “controls” used to shield commercial
entities and their regulators from public scrutiny, second-guessing and
68

See Jonathan Lynn, States Clash over Anti-Counterfeiting Enforcement, REUTERS,
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input, as well as accountability. If prevailing opinion within commercial
and administrative entities is that a lack of public input in relevant policy
decisions maintains or increases the commercial “health” of the regulated
industries, as may be indicated by the above examples, then we have a
problem of competing values and capture of administrative entities by
commercial interests that is long-overdue to be addressed.
In sum, it is both damaging to democracy and untenable to maintain a
FOIA that allows fundamental information about the expenditure of
taxpayer dollars, health and safety risks associated with a clean-up of a
major oil spill, and lawmaking itself, to be withheld from the public in an
environment where the sharing of information is getting increasingly
simple, pervasive and expected. While a certain level of secrecy is
necessary and even desirable in the functioning of government, as reflected
generally (if not perfectly) in the exemptions to FOIA, 70 excessive and/or
unjustified secrecy, as seen in the above examples, is problematic and
concerning. Indeed, the ACTA negotiations have proven that lawmaking
on issues of significant national concern becomes bogged down, rather than
streamlined and improved, when antiquated laws and assumptions about
transparency and secrecy merge. This paper seeks to advance that simple,
but important point, so that policymakers can move on to the next, more
challenging, question: how to update FOIA by acknowledging the close
partnership between government and the private sector and its impact on
what information is and is not disclosed to the public. If this issue is taken
up by the new Congress, the unfortunate experience of the ACTA
negotiations might be an impetus to meaningful change in how the United
States conceives its version of democracy. We’ll have fewer “distractions,”
and, by virtue of policymakers getting the benefit of meaningful, real-time
public input, we might get better, more balanced and legitimate IP laws—
and laws generally—as a result.

70

5 U.S.C. § 552(b); for criticism of FOIA in the context of trade secrets, see Levine,
supra note 32.
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